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The first thing to be said about bodies functioning in fields 
of concern to central government, not being government depart-
ments or elected local authorities, is that they come in an 
infinite variety. Some are set up under statute, some by Royal 
Charter, some by Royal Warrant, some by Ministerial Minute of 
Appointment, some even under the Companies Acts. Some are 
made up wholly of ministerial appointees, some include 
nominations from other sources, some have an elected element. 
Only a minority of members are paid by way of salary or fee, 
as distinct from expenses and payment for loss of remunerative 
time. Some are appointed for a specific task and disappear when 
they have discharged it, while some are standing bodies with 
continuing functions to perform. 
Some have executive functions in their own right, some are 
executive agents of Ministers, some have no executive functions 
at all. Some are spending money voted by Parliament, some 
operate commercially, some have other types of income (e.g. 
levies or registration fees), some incur no expenditure beyond 
their own expenses. Some are advisory, either in the sense of 
advising departments on points arising in the course of day-to-
day administration, or in the sense of conducting their own 
studies and producing formal reports with recommendations on 
matters of policy. 
If I attempted to cover the whole field in this chapter in 
any detail, the result would I fear be almost as chaotic as the 
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starting point. What I shall therefore do is to seek to identify 
the main segments of the field, and look more closely at one or 
two of the most recent Scottish additions to it that have special 
features of their own.l 
The simplest group is that of more or less expert advisory 
committees, where the object of the exercise is to contribute to 
the deliberations of Ministers and departments an expert input 
that may not be available at all, or not on a sufficiently 
comprehensive basis, among officers of the department. 
Committees composed predominantly of professional members 
are the clearest example of this, whether the professionals are 
doctors, farmers, teachers, or what you will. Especially where 
the bodies are set up by statute, an important part of the 
objective has been to reassure professional groups outside that 
they will have proper opportunities and facilities for making their 
views known at the appropriate stage in policy development or 
executive action by Government. 
Usually the statute will enjoin the Minister who has 
responsibility for appointing the members to consult with such 
organisations representing specific interests as may seem to him 
appropriate; and where the body is not statutory he will do so 
anyway. In practice some of the individuals suggested for 
appointment in the course of such consultations will in fact 
be appointed, but Ministers usually expect to be given a choice 
-i.e. there should be more suggestions than there are vacancies. 
Moreover the Minister may, for reasons of balance, find it 
necessary to appoint someone who was not included among the 
original suggestions. Provided consultations are conducted in 
good faith, I do not myself think there is much wrong with this 
part of the system. 
A variant in this group of bodies is the consultative council 
or committee, where the declared purpose is to provide a forum 
for full discussion between departments and outside interests 
of topics of mutual interest to the participants. Here, nomination 
of non-official members may be entirely appropriate. Ministerial 
or official chairmanship may also be useful, a device sometimes 
adopted for so-called advisory bodies but which has always 
seemed to me less appropriate in that particular context. 
Besides the expert advisory committee, which will usually 
have a continuing existence, more broadly based groups are set 
up from time to time to consider topics with considerable 
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ramifications, in the hope that a consensus of views will 
ultimately emerge as a basis on which administrative or legis-
lative action can then be taken with the minimum of dissension. 
For major issues such groups are often constituted as Royal 
Commissions, where the appointments are the responsibility 
of the Prime Minister as the Sovereign's principal adviser, and 
the Warrant of Appointment confers powers to compel the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of information. 
The issue that arises here is that such bodies may be set 
up in circumstances in which the Government itself might have 
taken a policy decision or initiative. This criticism is more a 
criticism of lack of political will than of the performance of 
· such Commissions or committees, and gains in validity when 
it becomes clear that the resulting report is taken as serving 
no more definitive a purpose than the basis of a further round 
of consultations with all interests in sight - or, worse, where 
no further action is taken at all. 
The next broad division I take to be that of bodies 
established with executive power exercised in the name of the 
Minister and at his expense. In financial terms much the most 
significant group is that of the health boards, of which there 
are now 15 in Scotland, spending something like £750 million 
of Government money this year. Except as regards general 
practitioner services, where the rights and duties of practitioners 
are closely governed by statutory regulations, the health boards 
discharge a fairly wide remit as agents of the Secretary of State, 
who can for this reason be called to account by Parliament for 
any of their actions. It is almost invariably his officers who 
appear before the Public Accounts Committee when health 
expenditure is under scrutiny. At the same time the boards can 
themselves sue and be sued and are not entitled to Crown 
privilege. 
Membership of the boards is not closely regulated by the 
statute, which contents itself with requiring consultation with 
local authorities and professional organisations, and also with 
universities for the medical teaching interest. Control by the 
Secretary of State is exercised partly by general guidance and 
partly by a system of budgetary approval. 
Historically, largely to overcome the initial reluctance of 
the medical profession to participate in a national health 
service at all, two separate administrative machines composed 
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of appointed members were created to administer the hospital 
services and the general practitioner services respectively. Local 
authorities continued to administer the public health services 
already established. This tripartite structure has now formally 
been replaced by a unified system of administration by appointed 
health boards, and the major question is whether such boards 
are needed at all. 
It is I suppose still the position that administration of the 
comprehensive health service by local authorities would not be 
acceptable to the professions. It is not quite so clear that 
administration by the Government department at its own hand, 
through decentralised offices as appropriate, would be equally 
unacceptable. What is clear is that the health boards have 
developed very extensive bureaucracies while at the same time 
there are still considerable numbers of staff in the central 
department concerned with the business of the boards. General 
policy and major items, such as the hospital building programme, 
are in fact in the hands of the central department. It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that some simpler system could reduce 
expense and increase efficiency. 
There is also in Scotland a statutory Central Services 
Agency, a rather curious animal. Its purpose is to discharge 
such health service functions as are thought to be best handled 
centrally rather than by health boards. Such functions may 
either be functions of the Secretary of State "delegated" by 
him, or functions of health boards referred to the Agency by 
statutory order and discharged by it on behalf of the boards. 
The major referred function is that of actually building hospitals, 
a task calling for highly specialised expertise that could not 
reasonably or economically be provided by each board as and 
when required. The Agency is under a Management Committee, 
appointed by the Secretary of State but partly on the nomination 
of health boards and partly after consultation with the boards. 
The need to maintain it alongside the central department is not 
to my mind self evident. 
Nor is Parliament by any means content to trust the 
Secretary of State and the health boards to get on with their 
assigned tasks. The statute provides also for the creation of a 
Scottish Health Service Planning Council, which has the duty 
of advising the Secretary of State on the exercise of his functions 
and also of making an annual report to him which he has to 
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lay before Parliament. Not all the members of this Council are 
appointed by the Secretary of State; each health board appoints 
a member, and so also do the university medical schools. The 
object of setting up the Council is partly to enlist all relevant 
expertise for planning and the formulation of policy, but partly 
also - and this is at least as important - to reassure the 
various professions that their interests and their expertise will 
in fact be given full weight. 
At health board level, there is another complete set of 
advisory bodies, the local health councils, charged with the 
task of representing the interests of the public in the health 
services in their localities. Here again the purpose is mainly to 
provide reassurance that health boards will be properly re-
sponsive to local needs and local views. In addition, there is an 
elaborate professional advisory committee structure at health 
board level. All parts of the advisory machinery - central and 
local - could of course be attached to a structure of administra-
tion by the central department itself. 
Other groups of bodies with executive responsibilities 
operating almost wholly on Government money include a 
number of Boards of Governors of specialist education establish-
ments, such as Colleges of Art and of Agriculture, Colleges of 
Education, and certain technical institutions falling outside the 
local authority field but short of university status; and also 
governing bodies of agricultural research institutes. The members 
are mostly drawn from a variety of nominating bodies, but 
some - and in a few cases all - are appointed by the Secretary 
of State at his own hand. Some of them provide expertise not 
readily available within the appropriate central department, and 
they give a valuable sense of identity to the individual 
institutions. They are not festooned with advisory bodies in the 
way the health boards are. 
Then there are two fairly distinct groups of regulatory 
bodies. On the one hand there are a variety of marketing bodies, 
e.g. the Milk Marketing Boards, the Herring Industry Board, 
and the White Fish Authority, where some kind of regulation 
and development of the industries was thought necessary. In 
some of these cases there is provision for elected as well as 
appointed members, and the degree of Ministerial intervention in 
their affairs is relatively limited. I suppose they carry in some 
degree the classic monopoly risk, as illustrated by the recent 
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EEC attack on the Milk Boards, but their operations seem 
to be generally acceptable. 
A second set of regulatory bodies are those concerned with 
the internal affairs of particular professions. The General 
Medical Council is the oldest of these, with detailed statutory 
composition and powers in relation to which Ministers play 
relatively little part. It was followed in due course by such other 
bodies as the General Dental Council, the General Nursing 
Council, the Central Midwives' Board, the General Teaching 
Council and many others. Election by the professions concerned, 
together with appointments by the teaching institutions, play 
the major part in providing the members of this Councils. If 
there is a criticism, it might be that these bodies - especially 
those concerned with ancillary workers - could become too 
inward-looking, perhaps attaching more importance to status 
and formal qualifications than to the practical skills necessary in 
the provision of services to the public. 
I must not yield to the temptation of going into the vast 
field of tribunals and analogous bodies in the social field, includ-
ing such diverse growths as the Rent Tribunals and the Children's 
Panels, or I might never emerge. So I will turn next to a 
number of bodies of fairly recent origin, of considerable 
significance in the economic or environmental field. I take them 
in order of their appearance on the scene. These are the New 
Town Development Corporations, the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board, the Countryside Commission for Scotland, 
the Scottish Tourist Board, and the Scottish Development 
Agency. The point to keep before us in looking at these bodies 
is whether their existence is really necessary. 
The first New Town Development Corporations were set 
up in the early post-war years, as instruments for the construc-
tion of New Towns in various parts of England and Scotland. 
I suppose the task could have been entrusted to the existing 
local authorities, but it was thought - rightly in my view -
that no such authority could be expected to devote the 
concentrated attention to a particular locality necessary to get 
major developments moving. And since by definition the New 
Towns were mostly planned for relatively undeveloped areas, 
election would not have been an appropriate way of setting 
them up. Appointment by the Secretary of State was therefore 
natural, although care has always been taken to include (on a 
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personal basis) members also serving on the local authority or 
authorities affected. 
Primarily, the New Town Development Corporations, as the 
name implies, are development authorities rather than local 
government authorities; and although they relieve the local 
authorities of some responsibilities, they depend on the 
authorities for a good deal of support - e.g. in the provision of 
services such as water supply and education. General planning 
control of the New Towns is mainly in the hands of the 
Secretary of State, operating through approval of master plans 
and approval - primarily in capital investment terms - of 
broad programmes in the housing, industrial or commercial 
fields. The Corporations operate for the most part on money 
lent by the Government, and in principle they were intended 
ultimately to become self-supporting. I do not think their work 
could have been done equally well otherwise, and there is already 
provision for winding them up when their purpose has been served. 
The Highlands and Islands Development Board, set up in 
1965, owed something to the New Town experience, but was 
rather a new kind of animal. It was given a very general remit to 
prepare and promote measures for the economic and social 
development of the Highlands and Islands, with specific powers 
to make grants and loans in support of industry, commerce, or 
any other relevant activity. Operating wholly on voted money, 
controlled by annual budgets settled with the Secretary of State, 
the Board also needed express Ministerial approval for general 
or specific proposals and for certain particular items such as the 
acquisition of land. Assistance to industry was governed by 
formal arrangements approved by the Secretary of State and 
the Treasury. 
While no particular qualifications or consultations were 
specified for Members of the Board, inevitably appointed by the 
Secretary of State, the Board was rather unusual in having 
several whole-time Members including the Chairman. Indeed 
the statute requires whole-time members to be in the majority, 
this having been conceded under pressure by the Parliamentary 
Opposition who argued that only in this way could the effective-
ness of the Board be secured. Necessarily these Members had 
to receive substantial salaries, a situation not arising in any of 
the other bodies with which I have so far dealt. 
Once again Parliament did not fully trust the Secretary 
I 
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of State and the Board to get on with the job without further 
guidance, and the Act also established the Highlands and Islands 
Development Consultative Council, to advise the Board on the 
exercise of their functions. There are some rather peculiar 
directions about consultations before Members are appointed -
inevitably by the Secretary of State - but there are no 
provisions for salaries or publication of reports. I suppose the 
Council might not have been set up had there not, for many 
years before the appointment of the Board, been a non-statutory 
Council whose task it was to facilitate the co-ordination of the 
work of government departments and other public agencies 
designed to promote Highland development. 
The Board has in my judgement done a good job, if at 
times an uneven one, and given the structure of local government 
at the time it was set up, I do not think its work could have 
been done so effectively by any other machinery. Now that we 
have reorganised local government, however, I am not so sure 
that the Board is indispensable. But I suppose that it is only 
sensible to wait and see what changes a Scottish Assembly may 
wish to make in the local government structure, assuming that 
an Assembly comes to pass. 
Next, the Countryside Commission for Scotland. This body 
made a relatively late entry on the countryside scene, the 
corresponding English Commission having been set up in 1949 
as the National Parks Commission and having done much to 
stimulate the development of National Parks south of the 
Border. The original Scottish view had been that separate 
National Park machinery was not necessary in Scotland. Instead, 
certain areas were identified as being specially important in this 
context and were made subject to "special planning control" 
under the Town and Country Planning Acts. In essence this 
involved the scrutiny of applications for proposed developments 
by the Secretary of State as well as by the local planning 
authority concerned. 
However, a variety of interested organisations continued to 
press the view that something more positive was needed in 
Scotland. Eventually the Countryside Commission for Scotland 
was set up by statute in 1967, the year before the National Parks 
Commission became the English Countryside Commission. 
Financed by a government grant, it is charged with the broad 
task of securing the development and improvement of facilities 
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for the enjoyment of the Scottish countryside and for the 
enhancement of its natural beauty and amenity. This the 
Commission seeks to do largely by education, persuasion and 
the provision of expert advice; but it also has limited powers 
of land acquisition and management, and of making grants 
and loans to persons other than public bodies. 
The Chairman and Members of the Countryside Commis-
sion are of course appointed by the Secretary of State, after 
consultation - as to part of the membership - with local 
authority associations and organisations representing countryside 
interests. In this way considerable expertise, associated with 
enthusiasm and supported by practical experience, is brought to 
bear on the issues arising. I would not myself assert that equal 
progress could have been made under purely departmental 
auspices, without the stimulus of the Commission. 
The Scottish Tourist Board was established as a statutory 
body in 1969. A non-statutory body had operated for many 
years past, under the joint auspices of the Secretary of State 
and the Scottish Council, Development and Industry. There was, 
however, a general feeling that something more effective was 
needed, with some financial backing from public funds; and 
the administration of such funds was held to require a statutory 
Board. Appointed by the Secretary of State, without the usual 
statutory directions as to consultations, the Scottish Board is 
part of wider machinery including corresponding Boards in 
England and Wales, and also the British Tourist Authority 
(appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade), on which the 
chairmen of the three Country Boards sit. The Authority 
concerns itself largely with overseas publicity, mainly using 
material supplied by the Country Boards. 
The Boards have a general remit to promote tourism, and 
have limited powers to give various forms of financial assistance 
subject to close Ministerial control. They also have powers to 
inspect tourist establishments, and there is provision - not yet 
invoked - for Ministerial orders authorising them to enforce a 
system of classification. In some ways the Scottish Tourist Board 
is analogous to the Countryside Commission for Scotland, 
although in practice it is a smaller body and has less obvious 
formal expertise among its Members. The case for maintaining 
it as a separate organisation outside departments is not to 
my mind so strong, although there could be no question of 
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dismantling the Scottish Board as long as the rest of the Great 
Britain structure remains. 
The last body I have chosen for mention in this context is 
the Scottish Development Agency. Established under an Act 
of 1975, this is generally regarded as a very important body in 
the Scottish economic and industrial scene. Its functions include 
not only virtually all aspects of economic development, but also 
the improvement of the environment. Like the New Town 
Corporations it is financed mainly by loans from the National 
Loans Fund, although there is also some revenue financing 
from voted money. Again its members are appointed by the 
Secretary of State, on a specification calling for experience in 
a variety of fields relating to its functions without mandatory 
consultations. Only the Chief Executive - appointed in the 
first place by the Secretary of State but subsequently by the 
Agency with the Secretary of State's approval - is a whole-
time Member of the Agency with a substantial salary. The 
present Chief Executive is in fact the Deputy Chairman. 
The Scottish Development Agency in some respects took 
the place of the earlier Scottish Industrial Development Office, 
an Office set up within the Department of Trade and Industry 
which had somewhat similar powers in the economic field. 
Following the 1974 election, however, the view prevailed that 
many decisions on support for and investment in particular 
industrial and allied enterprises could best be taken otherwise 
than in the Civil Service machine. Hence the Scottish Develop-
ment Agency, which also absorbed the former Scottish Industrial 
Estates Corporation and the Small Industries Council for the 
Rural Areas in Scotland. So far as loan finance at commercial 
rates is concerned, the Council has a fair degree of discretion, 
and provision is also made for equity participation. 
Where selective grants and loans at non-commercial rates 
are concerned, powers are still reserved in effect to the 
Secretary of State, although there is a curious arrangement for 
him to direct the Agency to exercise his powers in specified 
cases. In this latter field the Secretary of State has the assistance 
of a statutory advisory body, essentially a continuation of an 
earlier non-statutory advisory group which operated alongside 
the Scottish Industrial Development Office. The Agency is not 
obligated to consult this particular body, but informal contacts 
are maintained. 
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It is perhaps early to judge the success of the Scottish 
Development Agency, but it has been far more effective than 
some people, at least, expected. Certainly it has had to take 
decisions of a kind, and on a time scale, that would have been 
quite impracticable within a Civil Service machine where every 
issue involves the Minister's accountability to Parliament. 
For completeness I should at least say something about the 
nationalised industries, of which three - the two Electricity 
Boards and the Scottish Transport Group - operate under the 
umbrella of the Scottish Office. Ministerial control is limited 
and indirect; and most of the industries, although operating 
largely or wholly on capital advanced by the Government, depend 
on consumers and customers for their income and are under 
a duty broadly to balance their revenue accounts. Some form 
of appointment by Ministers has hitherto been regarded as the 
only possible arrangement, and relatively little criticism is in 
fact heard of the way this is done in Scotland. However, the 
developing theme of employee participation indicates a possible 
future method of identifying some of the members of the Boards. 
Ministerial control is in form exercised mainly through 
capital investment programmes which Boards have to submit for 
approval, and statutory approval of major schemes. There are 
statutory powers to Ministers to give general directions, but these 
powers have proved largely unworkable and ministerial influence 
is to a considerable extent exerted by informal means. Most 
nationalised industries are producing corporate plans, i.e. 
documents setting out their aims and intentions for appropriate 
periods of years, and these plans serve to assist Ministers in 
considering investment programmes for more limited periods 
ahead. 
Other restraints on the Scottish Electricity Boards include 
statutory Fisheries and Amenity Committees appointed by the 
Secretary of State, advising both Boards and having access to 
the Secretary of State who can oblige a Board to conform to 
a recommendation by either Committee. In addition, each Board 
has a Consultative Council, set up by statute with its chairman 
a Member of the Board, charged particularly with considering 
matters of interest to consumers and again having access to the 
Secretary of State. Although its Members are appointed by the 
Secretary of State, he is obliged to draw between two-fifths and 
three-fifths of the Members from a panel of persons nominated 
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by the appropriate local authority association; and the balance, 
after appropriate consultations, from persons representing 
agriculture, commerce, industry, labour and the general interests 
of consumers. Here then is another example of the kind of 
checks and balances that Parliament imposes. 
Moreover, electricity tariffs are subject to scrutiny by the 
Price Commission, who can delay price increases for detailed 
investigation under the auspices of the Commission. Most of 
the Scottish Transport Group's affairs are, however, excluded 
from the field of the Price Commission, being controlled instead 
by Ministerially appointed independent statutory Traffic Com-
missioners who discharge a wide range of licensing and regulatory 
functions relating to Road Traffic. 
It is plain - and grows plainer every day - that govern-
ment departments, as hitherto understood, are not suitable 
instruments for running commercial operations. Parliament has 
recognised this by setting up the Boards, but it does not really 
trust its instruments to do the job. Hence the inevitable tensions 
that exist between a Minister and a nationalised industry -
inevitable if for no other reason than the different time scales 
as well as the different value judgments on which Ministers and 
most of the nationalised industries operate. At the same time it 
has to be accepted that the nationalised industries cannot in 
practice be left to operate on purely commercial criteria. A 
report of the National Economic Development Office in 1976 
dealt with all this at some length, and few would claim that 
the White Paper published in April 1978 has given final answers 
to all the issues that were or might be raised about control of 
nationalised industries and their relationships with Ministers.2 
This paper presents only a brief and necessarily incomplete 
survey of appointed and ad hoc bodies in the field of the Scottish 
Office. It may, however, be of some assistance to those who seek 
to identify particular aspects or areas of the subject for study in 
depth. 
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